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HIS paper is addressed to the future of qualitative stock exchange
listing requirements; that is shareholder protection or corporate
governance standards that go beyond market size or financial cri-
teria for listing. Although some qualitative listing standards became in-
corporated into the federal securities laws, most standards of this type are
considered appropriate to state corporation law, rather than federal law.
This tension between securities law and corporation law is not unique
to the United States, but our federal system gives that tension a particular
antithetical complexity which frequently has to be resolved by the courts
and Congress.
Since most large public companies are listed on a national stock ex-
change, listing standards have become national, although not necessarily
a part of federal law. In this context, since the Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc.
("Nasdaq") is the functional equivalent of a stock exchange, Nasdaq list-
ing requirements will be analyzed as having the same legal status as re-
quirements of the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. ("NYSE") or other
national stock exchanges.1 Part II of this paper will discuss the historical
development of qualitative listing standards and their function as a bridge
between federal and state law in the corporate governance area. Particu-
lar attention will be paid in Part III to the development of standards with
regard to audit committees and the one-share, one-vote controversy. The
history of these standards highlights the shaky legal footing of listing re-
quirements as "rules" under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Ex-
change Act"). 2
* Roberta S. Karmel is a Professor of Law and Co-Director for the Study of Interna-
tional Business law at Brooklyn Law School, and Of Counsel to Kelley Drye & Warren
LLP. She was a Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission from 1977-
1980. She was a public director of the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. from 1983-1989 and
she currently serves as a member of the National Adjudicatory Council of the NASD. The
research assistance of Brooklyn Law School student Daphna Abrams is gratefully
acknowledged.
1. Nasdaq is a partially owned subsidiary of the National Association of Security
Dealers, Inc. ("NASD"). Although it has been registered with the Securities and Ex-
change Commission ("SEC") as an exclusive information processor, it has filed for regis-
tration as a securities exchange. See Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading
Systems, Exchange Act Release No. 40,760, 63 Fed. Reg. 70,844, 70,852 (Dec. 22, 1998).
2. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1994).
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Stock exchange listing requirements have a long history and will proba-
bly remain in effect for a long time to come. However, trading market
competition and the demutualization and public ownership of stock ex-
changes could call into question the ability of exchanges to formulate and
enforce listing requirements. Part IV will discuss these developments.
This could mean that listing standards simply fall by the wayside as casu-
alties of stock market competition and legal uncertainty. That is not a
political likelihood, however. Rather, over time demutualization of stock
exchanges may lead to more direct government regulation of corporate
governance. If such regulation is undertaken by the Securities and Ex-
change Commission ("SEC"), a significant change in the balance of fed-
eral-state power with respect to corporate governance will occur.
Currently, there is an upsurge in investor activism fueled by anti-business
political agitation. Further, this resurgence of interest in corporate gov-
ernance matters is leading to the development of some new academic
theories about corporate and securities law. Part V will discuss the emer-
gence of a new social protest movement and its possible effect on the
policies of the SEC with regard to stock exchange listing requirements.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT AND LEGAL STATUS OF
LISTING STANDARDS
A. THE HISTORY OF STOCK EXCHANGE LISTING STANDARDS
1. The NYSE
The first NYSE listing standards were not considered a set policy by the
exchange but instead were flexible terms inserted in listing agreements
negotiated between each issuer and the exchange.3 The contractual flexi-
bility of listing agreements meant that listing standards were not uni-
formly enforced and were subject to change.4 Also, because such
standards were not retroactively applied, nonconforming issuers who had
obtained listings prior to a new rule were not delisted. Thus, the NYSE
employed no uniform set policy which applied to all listed companies.5
Nevertheless, this flexibility allowed the NYSE to change its listing agree-
ments according to its economic needs. 6
As early as 1869, a Committee on Stock List, a subcommittee of the
NYSE Board of Governors,7 was formed to evaluate applications to list
with the NYSE. 8 The Committee was primarily concerned with the quali-
tative character of the issuer: "the degree of national interest in the com-
pany, its standing in its particular field, the character of the market for its
3. Douglas C. Michael, Untenable Status of Corporate Governance Listing Standards
Under the Securities Exchange Act, 47 Bus. LAW. 1461 (1992).
4. Id. at 1466.
5. GILBERT W. COOKE, THE STOCK MARKETS 215 (1964).
6. CHARLES A. DICE & WILFORD J. EITEMAN, THE STOCK MARKET 117 (2nd ed.
1941).
7. GEORGE L. LEFFLER, THE STOCK MARKET 414 (1st ed. 1951),
8. COOKE, supra note 5, at 215; DICE & EITEMAN, supra note 6, at 110.
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products, its relative stability and position in the industry, and whether or
not it is engaged in an expanding activity and ha[d] prospects of maintain-
ing its position."9 Applicants were required to disclose information in-
cluding, but not limited to, the history and nature of its business, detailed
information regarding management, capitalization structure, stock provi-
sions and business financials, including a description of its accounting pol-
icies. 10 However, the NYSE was faced with an uphill battle and achieved
little success in regard to obtaining financial information from its listed
companies.11
After 1869, listing standards developed gradually.12 The slow rise in
standards occurred for two reasons: first, at that time, financial disclosure
was seen as antithetical to good business practices, 13 and second, listing
agreements were not binding on future agreements. However, with the
abolition of the NYSE's "Unlisted Department" in 1910, the exchange
successfully campaigned for more thorough disclosure from listing com-
panies.14 Between 1910 and 1929, the NYSE gradually secured agree-
ments with its listed companies to provide substantial financial disclosure
and to provide certain safeguards for investors.' 5
Historically, listing standards were seen as a substitute for government
regulation. The NYSE argued that if its listing standards for securities
offered for sale adequately protected the investing public, then govern-
ment regulation would be unnecessary.' 6 Former President of the NYSE,
Richard Whitney, stated in a memorandum submitted to the Committee
on Banking and Currency of the United States in 1932 the following in
support of furthering self-regulation of securities exchanges:
New forms of securities are frequently evolved, and changes in the
corporations acts of the states, together with changes in economic
conditions, give rise to frequent new problems as to forms of char-
ters, accounting methods, and business practices. The attitude of the
exchange is one of constant watchfulness to prevent the admission to
its list of securities of corporations the nature of whose business and
character of whose charters, or whose business and accounting prac-
tices, do not appear to adapt such securities to widely disseminated
public ownership. 17
9. DICE & EITEMAN, supra note 6, at 110.
10. Id. at 111-16.
11. LEFFLER, supra note 7, at 429
12. See id.; COOKE, supra note 5.
13. See LEFFLER, supra note 7.
14. Prior to 1910, the NYSE maintained "listed" and "unlisted" trading departments.
Issuers which did not disclose sufficient information about their issues were carried in the
unlisted department. However, with the recommendation of the Hughes Commission, the
unlisted department was abolished on April 1, 1910. ROBERT SOBEL, A HISTORY OF THE
NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, 1935 - 1975 (1975).
15. LEFFLER, supra note 7, at 430.
16. See Max Lowenthal, The Stock Exchange and Protective Committee Securities, 33
COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1294 (1933).
17. Id. at 1298 (citing Hearings on S. 84, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., Part I, at 285-56).
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Initially, the NYSE was concerned with financial disclosure,1 8 but this
emphasis precipitated several corporate governance listing standards. An
annual stockholder's meeting, the first corporate governance standard,
was imposed as a term within the listing agreement and was eventually
linked to annual reporting requirements. 19 By 1900, listing agreements
required companies to distribute annual reports to its stockholders.20 By
1909, those reports had to be distributed prior to the stockholders' annual
meeting.2 1 By 1914, agreements provided that a listed company notify
the exchange of any change in the rights of stockholders or in the re-
demption of preferred stock.22 By 1917, agreements provided for the dis-
closure of a semiannual income statement and balance sheet. 23 In 1926,
the NYSE adopted a one-share, one-vote listing standard.24 The history
of this standard and its demise will be discussed in Part III.
However, it was only after the stock market crash of 1929 that regula-
tors began to take seriously the need for and importance of financial dis-
closure for listed companies. Changing public attitudes led to the
establishment of a new policy on corporate publicity.25 The policy urged,
but did not require, companies to prepare financial reports by indepen-
dent accountants and to prepare detailed income statements.26 By 1932,
independent audits became mandatory for all new listed companies. 27
Also by 1932, companies agreed to report their earnings quarterly. 28 Fi-
nally, with the enactment of the Exchange Act, the policies of the NYSE
regarding independent audits became a matter of federal law.29 The
value of the NYSE's listing requirements was demonstrated by the fact
that "Congress closely tracked the NYSE disclosure requirements when it
drafted the Exchange Act."'30
Prior to the enactment of the Exchange Act, listing agreements re-
quired issuers annually to disclose all significant details about their finan-
cial condition, such as changes in the character of their business,
capitalization, and accounting policies, prior to the stockholders' meet-
ing. 31 Further, a listed company promised to have its books audited by
certified public accountants and to maintain a transfer agent and regis-
18. Id.
19. Michael, supra note 3, at 1467-68.
20. COOKE, supra note 5, at 216.
21. Michael, supra note 3, at 1467-68.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See Joel Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Share,
One Vote Controversy, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 687, 694-98 (1986).
25. LEFFLER, supra note 7, at 430.
26. Id.; COOKE, supra note 5, at 216.
27. LEFFLER, supra note 7, at 431.
28. COOKE, supra note 5, at 216.
29. See Items 25 and 26 of Schedule A to the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act),
15 U.S.C. §§ 77aa(25) and (26) (1994).
30. A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions with
Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925, 1008 (1999).
31. LEFFLER, supra note 7, at 425,430; DICE & EITEMAN, supra note 6, at 117; COOKE,
supra note 5, at 216.
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trar.32 Even after the promulgation of the Exchange Act, the NYSE was
still concerned with the practices of its listed companies. However, the
impetus for these changes may have been "the NYSE's focus during that
time on bolstering trading volume."'33 The NYSE believed that by ap-
pealing to the needs of the individual investor and improving corporate
governance practices, it could attract additional investors for already
listed shares. 34
By 1953, minimum quorum rules were established for shareholder
meetings. 35 Beginning in 1940, minimum voting rights were also required
for preferred stockholders.36 In 1955, the NYSE required shareholder
approval for any acquisition resulting in an increase of more than 20% of
its shares. 37 Then, in 1956, an independence requirement for directors
was initiated, a standard of future importance and controversy. 38 The
NYSE's emphasis on corporate governance included scrutiny of the fi-
nancial practices of listed companies. The NYSE's early statements re-
garding financial disclosure laid the groundwork for future rules; the
NYSE "did not desire to list companies unless their accounting policies
were sound and logical and found common acceptance among engineers
and accountants. ' 39 However, it was not until the 1970s that the Ex-
change required independent audit committee members, and this change
was the result of SEC pressure as will be explained in Part 111.40
Today, the NYSE's listing standards include policies and requirements
regarding "independent audit committees, ownership interests of corpo-
rate directors and officers, shareholders' voting rights, and other matters
affecting shareholders' ownership interests and the maintenance of fair
and orderly markets in listed securities," 41 including the election of inde-
pendent directors, holding annual shareholders' meetings, and the solici-
tation of proxies. 42 It has been argued that the NYSE's incentives were
disingenuous concerning investor protection, since its primary goal was to
successfully compete in the marketplace for listings among the ex-
changes.43 Notwithstanding those accusations, history illustrates that the
NYSE, since its inception, was dedicated to ensuring the integrity of the
securities markets and used listing standards as a device to protect inves-
tors and the market in general. If the NYSE believed that better listing
32. Id.
33. See Michael, supra note 3, at 1469.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. LEFFLER, supra note 7, at 432.
37. See Michael, supra note 3, at 1469.
38. Id.
39. LEFFLER, supra note 7, at 432.
40. See Michael, supra note 3, at 1469.
41. NYSE LIsTED COMPANY MANUAL, § 301.00 Introduction (1999), available at http:/
/www.nyse.com/listed/listed.html.
42. Jay D. Hansen, London Calling?: A Comparison of London and U.S. Stock Ex-
change Listing Requirements for Foreign Equity Securities, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L.
197, 207 (1995).
43. See Pritchard, supra note 30, at 1001-09.
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standards gave it a competitive edge, this does not mean investor protec-
tion was an unimportant goal. Stock exchange listing standards are
deeply rooted in NYSE history and may not be as easily compromised by
competition and demutualization as critics of the NYSE assume. Never-
theless, competition among exchanges and demutualization may reduce
the NYSE's bargaining leverage in pushing for higher standards.44 These
issues will be further discussed in Parts III and IV.
2. The American Stock Exhcange
Compared to the NYSE, the American Stock Exchange ("AMEX")
adopted significantly more lenient listing standards and initiated them at
a much later date in history. One possible explanation for this inaction is
because throughout AMEX's entire history, it competed with the NYSE
for listings. AMEX, previously known as the New York Curb Exchange
(the "Curb"), was used as a springboard for many smaller and less estab-
lished issuers to enter the market. A survey in the 1950s showed that
more than half of the securities listed on the NYSE were previously listed
on the Curb. 45 It was because of AMEX's position on many listing stan-
dards that it was able to maintain its name as the "great unlisted market
of the country. '4 6 Although AMEX's listings standards were more com-
petitive than the NYSE's, self-regulatory efforts were dismal and the ex-
change came under strict scrutiny from the SEC in the early 1960s.
A seasoner for the Big Board, the AMEX listed those securities which
could not meet the strict listing requirements of the NYSE. 47 Issuers try-
ing to avoid making corporate disclosures under the NYSE's disclosure
requirements would trade as an "unlisted" security on the Curb.48 The
1936 Amendments to Section 12 of the Exchange Act extended unlisted
trading privileges and enabled the Curb to survive since most of its issues
consisted of unlisted securities which could not meet the registration re-
quirements.49 The 1936 amendments also brought added competition
from regional stock exchanges.5 0 As a result, the Curb, as well as other
exchanges, sought additional listings during the 1930s, with scant atten-
tion to regulatory concerns. Despite the effects of new legislation and
increased competition, "the Curb remained the great unlisted market of
the country."'51 But "it was clear that the AMEX's campaign for more
44. Id. at 1008.
45. Id. at n.72.
46. Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, VI SECURITIES REGULATION 2770 (3d ed. 1990).
47. Id. at vol. I, 220.
48. Id. Those exchanges which permitted securities to be traded on a "unlisted" basis
were those who campaigned most against the abolishment of unlisted trading. Whereas
the NYSE abolished its unlisted trading department in 1910, AMEX was steadfast in re-
taining its unlisted securities and only took its first steps toward dismantlement in 1934.
Michael supra note 3, at 1472.
49. ROBERT SOBEL, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE, 1921-1971 129
(1972).
50. Id.
51. Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 46, at vol. VI, 2770.
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listings in the 1950s resulted in a higher quantity but arguably lower qual-
ity of listed companies. ''52
During the 1960s, reforms swept through the AMEX.53 In 1962, fol-
lowing the exposure of several scandals, the SEC issued a report criticiz-
ing almost every aspect of the AMEX's operations, including its board,
methods of stock listing and retention, and trading methods. 54 The SEC
concluded that the AMEX failed at achieving any type of self-regula-
tion.55 Only then, the AMEX began to initiate several reforms regarding
its organization and listing standards. 56 Soon thereafter, AMEX listing
standards required proxy solicitations and shareholder approval of cer-
tain transactions. 57 In 1968, AMEX published its first edition of the
AMEX Company Guide, which included policies regarding conflicts of
interests, directors, and voting rights. Conflicts of interest between share-
holders and their officers, directors, or substantial shareholders were con-
sidered on a case-by-case basis.58 The size and significance of the conflict
as well as its possible resolution were also taken into consideration. Al-
though not required, the AMEX policy "recommended" the appointment
of at least two independent directors, 59 a factor also considered when
evaluating the significance of a conflict of interest. The AMEX Company
Guide also included minimum quorum requirements. 60 Except in the ar-
eas of voting rights and independent directors and audit committees,
AMEX listings standards have remained relatively static since the 1970s.
Until 1976, the AMEX did not have an official policy concerning voting
rights. In 1972, AMEX's stated policy was to prohibit all issues of non-
voting common stock, but its practice was to consider each case on an
individual basis. Further, on several occasions, the AMEX did not refuse
to list such companies with disparate voting rights for its shareholders. 61
In particular, the AMEX decided to list Wang Laboratories, Inc.
("Wang") even though it had been rejected for listing by the NYSE be-
cause of unequal shareholder voting rights. In 1976, the AMEX pub-
lished the listing agreement with Wang, permitting a capitalization which
included a Class B common stock having one-tenth of one vote per share.
After 1976, listings on the AMEX were held to this so-called "Wang
Formula. ' 62 As will be described in Part III, this willingness by the
AMEX to list issuers which did not have a one-share, one-vote common
stock capitalization led to a race to the bottom between exchanges with
52. Michael, supra note 3, at 1473.
53. Id.; SOBEL, supra note 49, at 280-85.
54. SOBEL, supra note 49, at 297.
55. Id.
56. Michael, supra note 3, at 1473.
57. Id. at 1474.
58. AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE COMPANY GUIDE, § 121 Conflicts of Interest
(1968).
59. AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE COMPANY GUIDE, § 122 Outside Directors (1968).
60. Michael, supra note 3, at 1473.
61. Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 46, at vol. IV, 1839 n.302.
62. See Seligman, supra note 24, at 704.
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regard to a voting rights listing standard. However, in 1994, the NYSE,
AMEX, and the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.
("NASD") jointly adopted a minimum voting rights rule which prohibits
any reduction or restriction of shareholder voting rights through corpo-
rate action.63
The AMEX has similar, but "less exacting" independent audit commit-
tee standards than the NYSE. 64 The independence of audit committee
members, originally a recommendation for listing in 1980, became a
mandatory listing requirement in the early 1990s. Following the recom-
mendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effective-
ness of Corporate Audit Committees, the independence of those audit
committees and the financial literacy of directors were mandated, as will
be more fully explained in Part III.
3. Nasdaq
The history of Nasdaq listing requirements is rooted in state blue sky
merit regulation. Every state, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico
has a securities regulation statute. Some state blue sky regulation is merit
regulation. A merit regulator has the authority to prevent an issuer from
selling securities in the state because the offering or the issuer's capital
structure is "substantively unfair or presents excessive risk" to inves-
tors.65 Although the blue sky laws vary from state to state, they all con-
tain a requirement for registration of securities to be sold in the state.
However, most state securities laws traditionally provided an exemption
from their securities registration requirements to issuers which were
listed on a national securities exchange. This was known as the "blue
chip" exemption. Some states also provided an exemption for certain
over-the-counter securities. 66
In 1985, the Nasdaq initiated its first corporate governance listing stan-
dard in an effort to secure blue sky exemptions in a greater number of
states.67 These standards included the submission of annual and periodic
reports to shareholders, appointment of independent directors, an inde-
pendent audit committee, required shareholder participation in certain
corporate transactions, and execution of a listing agreement. 68 This was
part of a campaign for broader exemptions from state registration so that
securities listed on Nasdaq or designated as "National Market System Se-
curities" 69  would be exempt from state blue sky registration
requirements.
63. Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 46, at vol. IV, 1848-50.
64. See Seligman, supra note 24, at 690-92; see also In the Matter of the American
Stock Exchange, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 16,722, 19 S.E.C. 1106 (1980).
65. Ad Hoc Subcommitte on Merit Regulation of the State Regulation of Securities
Committee, Report on State Merit Regulation of Securities Offerings, 41 Bus. LAW 785, 787
(1986).
66. Id. at 833-35.
67. Michael, supra at note 3, at 1475; Seligman, supra note 24, at 705.
68. Michael, supra note 3, at 1475.
69. See Exchange Act Rule llAa-2-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.11Aa-2-1.
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This controversy concerning the merit of Nasdaq listing standards in
contrast to the standards of national securities exchanges was settled by
the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996,70 which pre-
empted state regulation of the securities registration and offering process
for "covered securities. '71 This means merit review is not applicable to
nationally traded securities, including Nasdaq listed securities. As a re-
sult, competition was eliminated between the NYSE, AMEX, and Nas-
daq for better listing standards where this competition was an effort to
exempt issuers from state blue sky merit review.
4. Foreign Issuers
Foreign issuers can obtain a waiver from many NYSE corporate gov-
ernance requirements if an independent counsel licensed in the issuer's
home country opines that its practices are not prohibited by the issuer's
domicile. This means, in effect, that if the laws in the issuer's home coun-
try are silent or do not explicitly require the standard, the foreign issuer
will be able to obtain a waiver.72 Under the AMEX and Nasdaq listing
rules, similar exemptions are available. 73
Although the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq all purport to apply financial
reporting and corporate governance requirements to foreign issuers, in
1987, the SEC approved rule changes which allowed the exchanges to
waive or modify certain enumerated listing standards for foreign issuers
on a case-by-case basis.74 Instead, a foreign issuer's compliance with the
"laws, customs, and practices" of its country of origin became determina-
tive for a U.S. listing.75 Those enumerated standards which may be
waived or modified include: "(1) [q]uarterly reporting of interim earn-
ings; (2) composition and election of the Board of Directors; (3) share-
holder approval requirements and voting rights; and (4) quorum
requirements for shareholder meetings. '76 The relaxed foreign issuer
70. National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110
Stat. 3416 (1996).
71. Securities Act, § 18(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(a)(3).
72. NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 41, § 103.00 Non-U.S. Companies.
73. This regime was criticized in James A. Fanto, The Absence of Cross-Cultural Com-
munications: SEC Mandatory Disclosures and Foreign Corporate Governance, 17 Nw. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 119 (1996).
74. Self-Regulatory Organizations, Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes by the
American Stock Exchange, Inc. and New York Stock Exchange, Inc. to Amend the Ex-
changes' Listing Standards for Foreign Companies, Exchange Act Release No. 24,634, 52
Fed. Reg. 24,230 (June 23, 1987) [hereinafter Foreign Issuer Rule Changes]. Prior to 1987,
the NASD did not have any corporate governance or shareholder reporting requirements.
Id. at 3. In 1987, under a new rule change, securities traded on the Nasdaq are considered
as part of the National Market System and are subject to the Commissions's reporting
requirements as well as corporate governance requirements similar to the NYSE and
AMEX. Self Regulatory Organizations; Transaction Reporting Plan; Order Approving
Amendments to the Transaction Reporting Plan with Respect to NASDAQ/NMS Securi-
ties, Exchange Act Release No. 24,633, 1, 52 Fed. Reg. 24,234 (June 23, 1987). In 1997,
these requirements were extended to Nasdaq SmallCap issuers as well. Id.
75. Foreign Issuer Rule Changes, supra note 74.
76. Id. at 2.
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listing standards stemmed from a recognition that many differences exist
between the corporate governance practices of foreign companies and
U.S. companies in the areas of voting and independent directors, quorum
requirements, and financial reporting. For example, the AMEX asserted
that "many foreign issuers are incorporated in nations which lack a his-
tory of providing shareholders with the same degree of participation in
the choice of management, and in voting of stock issuances, as is the
norm in this country" and that "[o]ther means of corporate accountability
and discipline are favored over shareholder voting as a check on
management."'77
However, the real impetus for change was global competition among
exchanges. A critic of the foreign issuer listing standards has argued that
the rule change was an SEC response "to the need[s] of its constituencies,
the U.S. stock exchanges and their investment banking members to de-
velop a U.S. market for foreign securities. '78 Differences among the cor-
porate governance practices of foreign issues would unduly inhibit those
companies from listing on American exchanges unless foreign issuers
were afforded special treatment.79
The SEC concluded that the foreign issuer listing rule would not have a
"detrimental competitive impact on domestic companies." 80 The SEC
stated that it was "appropriate to permit differentiations from the re-
quirements imposed on domestic companies in order to permit the ex-
changes to be more competitive on an international basis and to provide
access to U.S. investors to investment opportunities in a large number of
foreign securities." 81 Nevertheless, there is some concern that domestic
issuers will eventually campaign for a reduction in listings requirements
under the same justifications cited for foreign issuers, an argument for
equal treatment of all issuers.82
Because the reporting and disclosure requirements for listed compa-
nies are much more onerous than those required by a foreign issuer's
home country, it is very common for foreign issuers to seek waivers.
Waivers are routinely granted as long as the practices of the issuer do not
77. Self-Regulatory Organizations, Proposed Rule Change by American Stock Ex-
change Amending Section 110 of the Amex Company Guide to Modify Foreign Listing
Guidelines, Exchange Act Release No. 23,064, 1, 51 Fed. Reg. 11,125 (Apr. 1, 1986). In-
stead, one commentator has argued for a new set of disclosure rules for foreign issuers
which more adequately reflects the company's structure and disclosures more meaningful
information to investors. Fanto, supra note 73.
78. Id. at 177.
79. Self-Regulatory Organizations, Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes by the
American Stock Exchange, Inc. and New York Stock Exchange, Inc. to Amend the Ex-
changes' Listing Standards for Foreign Companies, Exchange Act Release No. 24,634, 1, 52
Fed. Reg. 24,230 (June 23, 1987). Supporting the exchanges' proposals, the SIA Interna-
tional Committee, in a comment letter to the SEC, noted that the "NASDQ's current lack
of corporate governance standards may have been a factor in the decisions by these com-
panies to choose NASDAQ." Id. at 4; see also Fanto, supra note 73.
80. Foreign Issuer Rules changes, supra note 74, at 3.




violate the law of the issuer's home country. The NYSE has stated that it
does not intend to limit waivers or exemptions to situations where it
would be impossible for a company to comply with a specific corporate
governance requirement and also comply with home country law,83 but
abuse of the rule will not be allowed. In an SEC release, the NYSE
stated the following: "If, for example, a waiver were available any time
compliance with SRO rule requirements imposed any additional burdens
on foreign companies beyond those imposed by law or custom by the
country of domicile, the proposals would be tantamount to eliminating all
listing standards in this area from foreign companies. '84
Despite the adoption of several corporate governance listing standards
for U.S. issuers, the exchanges' policies toward foreign issuers have re-
mained accommodating. In 1991, the SEC approved exchange rules
which mandate that issuers have at least two independent directors and
an audit committee composed of a majority of independent directors.
However, these requirements do not apply to foreign issuers as long as
the U.S. practice is inconsistent with the custom or practice of a foreign
issuer's home country.85 Advancing its position, the NYSE stated that its
policies are consistent with the SEC's foreign issuer guidelines. 86
Similarly, foreign issuers are exempt from changes to the NYSE,
AMEX, and NASD's rules governing the voting rights of common share-
holders adopted in 1994.87 The exchange rules exempt issuances or ac-
tions by foreign issuers from these voting rights rules as long as the
company's voting structure is not prohibited by the issuer's home coun-
try's laws. 88 Accordingly, foreign issuers could meet exchange listing
standards regarding voting rights if it either complied with the require-
ments of Rule 19c-4 (discussed in Part III(C) below) or was in compli-
ance with the issuer's home country laws. 89
In 1989, the SEC approved another NYSE rule change liberalizing the
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Self-Regulatory Organizations, the American Stock Exchange, Order Approving
Proposed Rule Change and Notice and Order Granting Accelerated Approval to Amend-
ment No. 1 Relating to Independent Directors and Audit Committees, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 29796, 56 Fed. Reg. 51,953 (Oct. 8, 1991).
86. "The fact that its proposed audit committee requirements will not apply to foreign
issuers if the requirement is inconsistent with the custom and/or practice in the company's
country of domicile is consistent with the Exchange's foreign issuer guidelines." Id. at 4.
87. Self-Regulatory Organizations, American Stock Exchange, Inc., National Associa-
tion of Securities Dealers, Inc. and New York Stock Exchange, Inc., Order Granting Ap-
proval to Rule Changes Relating to the Exchanges' and Association's Rules Regarding
Shareholder Voting Rights, Exchange Act Release No. 35,121, 1, 59 Fed. Reg. 66,570
(Dec. 19, 1994).
88. Id. at 3.
89. Self-Regulatory Organizations, New York Stock Exchange, Inc., Order Partially
Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to Amendments to the Exchange's Voting
Rights Listing Standards and Listing Standards for Non-U.S. Companies as set forth in
Sections 313.00 and 103.00 of the Exchange's Listed Company Manual, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 27,554, 2, 54 Fed. Reg. 53,227 (Dec. 20, 1989).
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procedures for foreign issuers listing on a U.S. exchange. 90 The rule al-
lows the exchange to consider any "nonconforming practice" of a foreign
issuer which is not prohibited by the laws of the issuer's home country
rather than limiting the exchanges' consideration to those "nonconform-
ing practices" which are consistent with the practice of the issuer's home
country. 91 The purpose of the rule was to reduce administrative burdens
on foreign issuers; the exchanges claimed that obtaining certification that
nonconforming practice is not prohibited under the law is easier than
showing that the practice is consistent with the custom of a particular
country. 92
Excusing foreign issuers from listing standards can be justified on the
ground that corporate governance is generally a matter of home state
regulation, but it can also be viewed as a means to attract foreign issuer
listings in a competitive global market. Thus, the competition for listings
can result in races to the top or races to the bottom, depending upon how
an exchange perceives its competitive edge with regard to particular list-
ing standards. 93
B. THE SEC's AUTHORITY OVER CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Corporate governance is primarily a matter of state corporation law.
This was expressed by the United States Supreme Court in a non-securi-
ties law case as follows:
Corporations are creatures of state law, and investors commit their
funds to corporate directors on the understanding that, except where
federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors
with respect to stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs
of the corporation.94
Thereafter, in Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green,95 the Court applied this
principle in a case arising under the federal securities laws involving a
90. Id. In 1991, the SEC approved a similar rule change by the AMEX. Self-Regula-
tory Organizations, American Stock Exchange, Inc., Order Approving Proposed Rule
Change Relating to Foreign Issuers and Rights Offerings, Exchange Act Release No.
28,832, 1, 56 Fed. Reg. 4658 (Jan. 29, 1991) [hereinafter Amex Foreign Issuers].
91. Amex Foreign Issuers, supra note 90, at n.3.
92. Id. at 2. In 1994, the SEC also approved NYSE rule changes permitting foreign
issuers to distribute summary annual reports in the place of full annual reports only if it is
the practice in the issuer's home country and on the condition that certain procedural
safeguards are met. Self-Regulatory Organizations, New York Stock Exchange, Inc., Or-
der Granting Approval to Proposed Rule Change and Notice of Filing and Order Granting
Accelerated Approval to Amendment No. 1 to Proposed Rule Change Relating to Listing
Standard for Non-U.S. Companies, Exchange Act Release No. 33,661, 1, 59 Fed. Reg.
10,028 (Feb. 23, 1994). On July 1, 1994, a similar AMEX rule was approved. Self-Regula-
tory Organizations, American Stock Exchange, Inc., Order Granting Approval to Pro-
posed Rule Change and Notice of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval to
Amendment No. 1 to Proposed Rule Change Relating to Listing Standards for Non-U.S.
Companies, Exchange Act Release No. 34,300, 59 Fed. Reg. 35,156 (July 1, 1994).
93. Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regu-
lation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2419-22 (1998).
94. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975).
95. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
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short form merger. Under Delaware law owners of at least ninety per-
cent of a subsidiary's stock may merge with that subsidiary without re-
questing the consent of minority shareholders-who, in turn, must receive
fair value for their shares. The plaintiff, the minority shareholders in
Santa Fe, did not allege any material misrepresentation or omission.
Rather, they argued that the antifraud provisions of the federal securities
laws were applicable to a breach of corporate fiduciary duty, in that the
majority shareholders were not pursuing a legitimate corporate purpose.
The Court, however, refused to apply Rule 10b-5 to allegations of inter-
nal corporate mismanagement. It stated: "Absent a clear indication of
congressional intent, we are reluctant to federalize the substantial portion
of the law of corporations that deals with transactions in securities, partic-
ularly where established state policies of corporate regulation would be
overridden. "96
In Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc.,97 the Supreme Court indicated that
Santa Fe would not be confined to its facts, but rather was a general hold-
ing concerning fiduciary duty. Schreiber raised the issue of whether the
withdrawal of a hostile tender offer bid and the substitution of a partial
bid, following negotiations with the target company's management, con-
stituted a manipulative act under the Williams Act.98 The Court held that
the term "manipulation" in sections 10(b) and 14(c) of the Exchange
Act99 should be similarly interpreted and that manipulative acts require
misrepresentation or nondisclosure.
Nevertheless, the SEC has long claimed authority and expertise with
respect to corporate governance and made its views felt through disclo-
sure and other regulation. William 0. Douglas, an early SEC Chairman
and then Supreme Court Justice wrote:
Both prior to and during my SEC days I had promoted the idea of
having 'public' directors of our large corporations... The reason was
that, by and large, directors tend to become subservient to the man-
agement, courteously servings its interests, which are not necessarily
consistent with the interest of stockholders or compatible with the
public reputation of the company... at least some of the directors of
our large corporations must not be subservient to management. This
was a policy which the SEC had power to enforce. 100
The views of Justice Douglas remain controversial. The more common
view is that the Securities Act is a full disclosure, rather than a merit,
statute and the SEC does not have the power to regulate corporate gov-
ernance. Even in the case generally cited as the first to focus on manage-
ment integrity and corporate governance issues, In re Franchard,101 the
96. Id. at 479.
97. 472 U.S. 1 (1985).
98. The Williams Act, which regulates tender offers, is contained in §§ 13(d)-(e) and
14(d)-(f) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e) and 78n(d)-(f) and the regulations
thereunder, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-1 to 13e-101, 240.14a-1 to 14f-1.
99. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), n(e).
100. WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, Go EAST YOUNG MAN 272 (1974).
101. 42 S.E.C. 163 (1964).
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SEC backed off from sanctioning directors neglect of duty in failing to
deal with a CEO who was making unauthorized loans to himself. In this
stop order proceeding, the staff had argued that prospectuses were defi-
cient in not disclosing that the directors, in overseeing the operations of
the company, failed to exercise the degree of diligence required. The
Commission viewed this as an "issue raising fundamental considerations
as to the functions of the disclosure requirements of the Securities
Act. ' 10 2 In deciding this issue, the Commission held that the Securities
Act did not
define Federal standards of directors' responsibility in the ordinary
operations of business enterprises and nowhere empowers us to for-
mulate administratively such regulatory standards. The diligence re-
quired of registrant's directors in overseeing its affairs is to be
evaluated in the light of the standards established by State statutory
and common law. 103
In this case, the Commission thus anticipated the holding of the Court in
Santa Fe.
Nevertheless, the SEC has had a tendency to use disclosure require-
ments for their prophylactic effect of regulating corporate conduct. In
addition, various provisions of the Exchange Act can and have been used
by the SEC to effect corporate conduct. These include regulatory author-
ity over proxy solicitations 10 4 and regulatory authority over tender of-
fers.105 Further a catch-all antifraud provision'0 6 and broad rulemaking
authority107 gave the SEC the ability to utilize enforcement cases and
disclosure rules to impose its notions about corporate governance on
public companies. In a wide variety of management fraud cases' 0 8 and
disclosure rules concerning management remuneration' 0 9 the SEC suc-
ceeded in regulating corporate governance. Another weapon which the
SEC was given that might have been used to federalize corporate govern-
ance was its power to define "qualified securities" in a national market
system. 10 But, as will be discussed in connection with the one-share,
one-vote controversy, the potential for using this power to achieve corpo-
rate governance objectives by way of SEC changes to stock exchange list-
ing rules has thus far not been realized.
When the SEC tested the limits of its authority in dictating corporate
governance standards for stock exchange listing requirements, it suc-
ceeded with respect to requirements for audit committees, but failed with
respect to the one-share, one-vote controversy. As a result, stock ex-
102. Id. at 172.
103. Id.
104. 15 U.S.C. § 78n.
105. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f).
106. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
107. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a).
108. See Exchange Act Release No. 13,901, 42 Fed. Reg. 44,860 (Aug. 29, 1977); Ex-
change Act Release No. 13,482, 42 Fed. Reg. 23,901 (Apr. 28, 1977).
109. See Item 402, Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402.
110. 15 U.S.C. § 78kl(a)(2). This provision was added to the Exchange Act in 1975.
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change listing standards operate as a bridge between state and federal law
with respect to corporate governance, but their legal status is uncertain.
III. THE SEC'S AUTHORITY OVER STOCK
EXCHANGE RULEMAKING
A. STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Until 1975, exchange listing standards were clearly the subject of pri-
vate or contract law between an exchange and its listed companies. How-
ever, in 1975, Congress laid the foundation for the establishment of a
national market system in amendments to the Exchange Act. Without
mandating specific components of the national market system or even
defining the term, Congress vested the SEC with broad flexible authority
to design, implement, and regulate the trading markets. Further, impor-
tant new powers over stock exchanges and the NASD were given to the
SEC. Sections 19(b) and (c) of the Exchange Act gave the SEC a new
power to approve, disapprove, abrogate, add to, or delete from rules
adopted by exchanges.111 Any amendments to any exchange rules man-
dated by the SEC remain rules of the exchange and do not become SEC
rules.112 Nevertheless, the SEC's authority under section 19(c) is limited
to actions in "furtherance of the purposes" of the Exchange Act.113
In addition to the generalized power over exchange rulemaking con-
tained in section 19, the SEC has authority to establish criteria for "quali-
fied securities." Although this authority is not facially limited by the
statute, it is limited implicitly by the objectives of the national market
system because of section 19(c). One of these principles is that the secur-
ities qualified to be included in the national market system should depend
primarily on their trading characteristics, rather than where they happen
to be traded. The Senate Report accompanying the 1975 amendments,
for example, noted that "many securities do not have the characteris-
tics-e.g., trading volume, price, and number of stockholders-which
would justify auction-type trading. 11 4 Also, the Exchange Act was
amended in 1975 to provide that it is in the "public interest and appropri-
ate for the protection of investors and the maintenance of fair and or-
derly markets to assure... fair competition.., among exchange markets,
and between exchange markets and markets other than exchange mar-
kets." Thus, in giving the SEC authority to define "qualified securities" it
would appear that Congress intended the SEC to equalize listing stan-
dards of competing marketplaces, if this were necessary to achieve the
statutory purposes of the Exchange Act.
111. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78s(b)-(c).
112. 15 U.S.C. § 78a(c)(4)(C).
113. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c).
114. S. REP. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, at 16 (1975).
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B. AUDIT COMMIT-rEE REQUIREMENTS
As early as 1940, the SEC recommended that corporations form audit
committees composed of independent directors. 115 The SEC did not
have an opportunity to force such a requirement on public companies,
however, until the 1970s. In connection with widespread scandals con-
cerning questionable or illegal payments by many public corporations to
domestic and foreign government officials, the SEC discovered inade-
quate or improper corporate books and records that concealed the exis-
tence of these payments. This was very disturbing since the integrity of
corporate books and records is essential to the entire reporting system
administered by the SEC. 116 Among other things, the SEC pointed to the
importance of audit committees in uncovering falsification of corporate
records and the use of "slush" funds and endorsed audit committees as
appropriate models of corporate conduct. 117 Following its investigation
into the sensitive payments scandal, the SEC urged strengthening the in-
dependence and vitality of corporate boards of directors, and suggested,
in a letter from SEC Chairman Roderick Hills to William M. Batten, then
Chairman of the NYSE, that the NYSE "could take the lead in this area
by appropriately revising its listing requirements, thus providing a practi-
cal means effecting... important objectives without increasing direct gov-
ernmental regulation.""118
The NYSE thereafter developed such a proposal. On March 9, 1977,
the SEC then approved the NYSE rule requiring all listed domestic com-
panies to establish by June 30, 1978, and maintain thereafter, an audit
committee comprised solely of directors independent of management and
free from any relationship that "would interfere with the exercise of inde-
pendent judgement as a committee member." 1 9 Further, a majority of
the audit committee was required to be composed of directors who were
not formerly officers of the company or one of its subsidiaries. 120 'There-
after, the AMEX and Nasdaq imposed similar requirements on their
listed companies, but required only that a majority of the audit commit-
tee members be independent. 12'
The voluntariness of the NYSE's adoption of this rule was debatable.
So was the extent of the SEC's power to compel the NYSE to change its
115. In re McKesson & Robins, Inc., Accounting Series Release No. 19, Exchange Act
Release No. 2707, [1940 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 72,020 (Dec. 5, 1940).
116. Report of the Commission on Questionable and Illegal Corporate Payments and
Practices, to the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1976), at 48-49.
117. See id. at 55-56.
118. Letter from Roderick M. Hills to William M. Batten, May 11, 1976.
119. In the Matter of New York Stock Exchange, Inc., Exchange Act Release No.
13346, 11 S.E.C. 1945 (Mar. 9,1977).
120. NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 41, § 303.00 Audit Committee
(1983).
121. THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, § 3.05, cmt. a (1992) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES].
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listing requirements.122 Although the SEC might have invoked its power
to modify exchange listing requirements, since it is questionable that the
SEC could compel issuers to form audit committees, it could have been
argued that the SEC's power to mandate listing requirements to this ef-
fect was not in furtherance of the purposes of the Exchange Act. Such an
analysis would have been in keeping with the Court's demarcation be-
tween federal and state power in Santa Fe. On the other hand, the SEC
has fairly broad powers to define auditor independence. 123 Further, the
SEC has the power to mandate disclosure about corporate governance
matters, and about this same time it exercised its authority by requiring a
description of the structure of certain board committees, including the
audit committee. 124
Over the next two decades, the mantra that a board of directors should
be composed of persons independent of management was spread around
the world by regulators and institutional investors. A steady stream of
reports and recommendations by blue ribbon committees 125 and distin-
guished business and legal bodies 126 praised the value of independent di-
rectors in giving capitalism credibility.' 27 In 1998, in response to an
expressed concern by the SEC about the adequacy of the oversight of the
audit process by independent directors, the heads of the NYSE and the
NASD appointed a Blue Ribbon Committee that issued a report on this
122. See Proceedings, the Airlie House Symposium, An In-Depth Analysis of the Fed-
eral and State Roles Regulating Corporate Management, June 13-14, 1975, Airlie House,
Warrenton, Virginia, reprinted in 31 Bus. LAW. 863, 1096 (1976).
123. See Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements, Securities
Act Release No. 7919, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,008 (Nov. 21, 2000) [hereinafter Auditor Indepen-
dence Requirements]; Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements,
Securities Act Release No. 7870, 65 Fed. Reg. 43,148, at n.14 (June 30, 2000).
124. Shareholder Communications, Shareholder Participation in the Corporate Electo-
ral Process and Corporate Governance Generally, Exchange Act Release No. 15,384, 43
Fed. Reg. 58,522 (Dec. 14, 1978). The SEC initially proposed much broader rulemaking
that would have classified directors as "independent" or "not independent." See Proposed
Rules Relating to Shareholder Communications, Shareholder Participation in the Corpo-
rate Electoral Process and Corporate Governance Generally, Exchange Act Release No.
14970, 43 Fed. Reg. 31,945 (July 24, 1978). The author dissented from the issuance of this
proposal.
125. See, e.g., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE ON
IMPROVING THE EFFEcTIVENESS OF CORPORATE AUDIT COMMITTEES, reprinted in 54 Bus.
LAW. 1067 (1999) [hereinafter REPORT ON AUDIT COMMITTEES]; A REPORT TO THE
OECD BY THE BUSINESS SECTOR ADVISORY GROUP ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, COR-
PORATE GOVERNANCE: IMPROVING COMPETITIVENESS AND ACCESS TO CAPITAL IN
GLOBAL MARKETS (Apr. 1998); REPORT OF THE NACD BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION ON
DIREC'OR PROFESSIONALISM (1996).
126. BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE STATEMENT ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (1997); ABA
Section of Business Law, Corporate Director's Guidebook-1994 Ed., 49 Bus. LAW 1243
(1994); ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 121.
127. Only a few hardy academics have questioned whether independent directors im-
prove business performance. See Sanjat Bhagat & Bernard Black, Board Composition and
Firm Performance: The Uneasy Case for Majority-Independent Boards, 1053 PLI/CoRP. 95
(1998); Victor Brudney, The Independent Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95
HARV. L. REV. 597, 616-22, 642-59 (1982); Laura Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside Direc-




subject a year later.128 The Committee recommended a more stringent
definition of "independence" for audit committee members than ex-
change rules contained, that listed companies with a market capitalization
above $200 million have an audit committee composed solely of indepen-
dent directors, and that audit committee members be financially liter-
ate.129 Following these recommendations, the NYSE, NASD, AMEX,
and SEC came out with rules to implement the Blue Ribbon Report. 130
The NYSE listing standards therefore now provide that each listed
company must have a qualified audit committee that meets certain stan-
dards. The audit committee must have a formal written charter specify-
ing the scope of the committee's responsibilities and how they are
implemented, including the accountability of the outside auditor to the
board and audit committee and that the committee satisfies itself that the
outside auditor is independent. In addition, the audit committee must
have at least three directors who have no relationship to the company
that may interfere with their independence, and each member must be
financially literate; one member must have accounting or related financial
management expertise. 31 The new AMEX and NASD rules are essen-
tially the same, but have slightly different definitions of "independence"
and financial literacy. 132
128. REPORT ON AUDrr COMMITTEES, supra note 125.
129. Id. at 3-4.
130. Auditor Independence Requirements, supra note 123; Self-Regulatory Organiza-
tions, Order Approving Proposed Rule Change by the American Stock Exchange LLC
Amending the Exchange's Audit Committee Requirements and Notice of Filing and Order
Granting Accelerated Approval of Amendments No. 1 and 2 Thereto, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 42,232, 64 Fed. Reg. 71,518 (Dec. 14, 1999) [hereinafter AMEX Audit Commit-
tee Rules]; Self-Regulatory Organizations, Order Approving Proposed Rule Change by
the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. Amending its Audit Committee Re-
quirements and Notice of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval of Amend-
ments No. 1 and 2 Thereto, Exchange Act Release No. 42,231, 64 Fed. Reg. 71,523 (Dec.
14, 1999) [hereinafter NASD Audit Committee Rules]; Self-Regulatory Organizations, Or-
der Approving Proposed Rule Change by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Amending
the Exchange's Audit Committee Requirements and Notice of Filing and Order Granting
Accelerated Approval of Amendments No. 1 and 2 Thereto, Exchange Act Release No.
42,233, 64 Fed. Reg. 71,529 (Dec. 14, 1999) [hereinafter NYSE Audit Committee Rules].
131. New SEC disclosure rules complement these requirements. See Audit Committee
Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 42,266, 64 Fed. Reg. 73,389 (Dec. 22, 1999).
132. Under the NYSE Rule, the independence and financial literacy of audit committee
members is interpreted by the company's board in its business judgement. Therefore, di-
rectors who have some kind of business relationship to the company "may serve on the
audit committee only if the company's board determines in its business judgment that the
relationship does not interfere with the director's exercise of independent judgment." It is
clear, however, that directors who are principals of companies with a material business
interest with the issuer would not usually be considered independent. NYSE Audit Com-
mittee Rules, supra note 130, at 71,533. In contrast, the NASD's and AMEX's definitions
do not rely on the opinion of the company's board and prohibit certain persons from ob-
taining independence status and require audit committee members to display certain skills.
Audit committee members must be able to "read and understand fundamental financial
statements, including a company's balance sheet, income statement, and cash flow state-
ment." NASD Audit Committee Rules, supra note 130, at 71,525; AMEX Audit Commit-
tee Rules, supra note 130, at 71,519.
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In this more recent round of rulemaking on audit committees there
were almost no voices raised questioning the SEC's authority to pressure
exchanges into revising their listing requirements, even though the D.C.
Circuit Court had in the interim between 1977 and 1999 struck down the
SEC's efforts to impose a one-share, one-vote standard on exchanges, as
will be explained below. Whether this was because of general agreement
on the advisability of the tightened standard, or the exchange's seeming
voluntary initiatives with regard to improving its audit committee re-
quirements, is unclear. As a practical matter, the SEC has enormous lev-
erage over exchanges and so they are unlikely to resist SEC "suggestions"
that are not controversial or perceived by an exchange to be contrary to
its interests.
C. THE ONE-SHARE, ONE-VOTE LISTING REQUIREMENT
An important shareholder protection listing standard that was in effect
at the NYSE from 1926 until the late 1980s was the principle that all
shares of common stock of a listed company should have one vote. Dur-
ing the hostile takeover boom of the 1980s, however, some companies
engaged in defensive recapitalizations whereby company insiders ob-
tained shares with greater voting rights than public shareholders. Some
well known AMEX listed companies, for example Wang, had a weighted
capitalization of ten to one in favor of insiders and, as explained in Part II
above, such unequal voting shares were permitted by the AMEX and
Nasdaq. 133 The NYSE proved unable to resist this competition, espe-
cially after General Motors Corporation ("GM") issued a class of lesser-
weighted voting shares in connection with its acquisition of Electronic
Data Systems, Inc. ("EDS"). 134 Further, although the SEC attempted to
impose a voting rights standard on all exchanges, its authority to do so
was negated by the D.C. Circuit Court.
During the 1920s, dual class issuances were motivated by the desire to
raise additional equity capital and simultaneously retain control in the
hands of a founding family or entrepreneurial group.135 These shares
were ordinarily called "bankers' shares" and resulted in a phenomenon
called "bankers' control," where voting rights were held exclusively by
one class of stock. 136 Professor William Z. Ripley, heralded public outcry
against these dual class structures, stating that "they form one of the ma-
jor problems which lie on the border line between corporation law and
financial practice."'1 37
133. See Study Predicts NYSE Will Permit Dual Classes of Stock With Unequal Voting
Rights, Daily Rep. Exec. (BNA) No. 21, at A-2 (Jan. 31, 1986).
134. See David A. Vise, GM Runs Afoul of NYSE Rule Created New Class of Stock to
Pay for Hughes Deal, WASH. POST, June 7, 1985, at B1.
135. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Short Life and Resurrection of SEC Rule 19c-4, 69
WASH. U. L.Q. 565, 570 (1991).
136. Non-Voting Stock and Bankers' Control, 39 HARV. L. REV. 673, 674 (1926).
137. Id. (citing Address of William Z. Ripley before American Academy of Political
Science, reported, NEw YORK TIMES, Oct. 29, 1925, at 27, republished as More Power to the
Bankers, 121 NATION 618 (Dec. 2, 1925)).
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Again in the 1980s, dual class capital structures became popular. How-
ever, this resurgence was not due to the same motivators as in the 1920s.
Dual class voting structures of the 1980s were developed in response to
management's fear of hostile takeovers to ensure that voting control re-
mained with management and corporate insiders. By creating dual clas-
ses of. common stock, management and corporate insiders could maintain
a controlling interest in the firm without having to contribute substantial
amounts of equity. Although an effective defense to corporate takeovers,
the separation of ownership and voting control were seen as adverse to
the interests of common stockholders and therefore, the issue of voting
rights became very controversial. 138 As explained in Part II, among the
most influential stock exchanges, the NYSE set the most restrictive stan-
dards regarding voting rights, with an absolute restriction on any infringe-
ment on shareholder voting rights, 139 while the NASD placed no
restrictions on the creation of dual classes of common stock and the
AMEX had limited restrictions.
As early as the 1920s, the NYSE was skeptical of listing nonvoting com-
mon stock. Disparate voting rights were seen as adverse to notions of
investor protection because those who had contributed the most capital
generally were given the least amount of voting rights. The roots of the
NYSE's policy were planted in a 1926 announcement regarding the listing
of Dodge Brothers, Inc., which had held a disproportionate amount of
non-voting common stock in relation to its voting common stock.'40
There was much public outcry and the NYSE responded by stating:
"Without at this time attempting to formulate a definite policy, attention
should be drawn to the fact that in the future the committee, in consider-
ing applications for the listing of securities, will give careful thought to
the matter of voting control.' 141
The NYSE enforced its rule for more than a half a century thereafter.
But in 1984, when GM acquired EDS, it refused to comply with the
NYSE rule and threatened to list with competitor exchanges AMEX or
Nasdaq. Because of the importance of GM as a listed company, the
NYSE ignored its rule and did not delist GM. Two motivating factors for
the NYSE were: to counter threatened competition from other ex-
changes, and to provide corporate managers with a new takeover de-
fense, which issuers wanted during the 1980s. 142 With the continued
listing of GM, the path was now clear for other companies with similar
138. During the 1980s, dual class voting structures were established to ensure that vot-
ing control remained with management and corporate insiders. Bainbridge, supra note 135
("Voting rights do matter in one critical context - contests for corporate control.").
139. See Daniel F. Fischel, Organized Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual Class
Common Stock, 54 U CHI. L. REV. 119 (1987).
140. Seligman, supra note 24, at 699; Bainbridge, supra note 135, at 569.
141. Seligman, supra note 24, at 699. The statement generally is cited as the first unoffi-
cial announcement of the disapproval of disparate voting rights among holders of stock of
public companies. Id.
142. Id. at 701. The NYSE rationalized this decision on the theory that GM was en-
gaged in a financing transaction concerning its purchase of EDS.
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intentions. In June 1984, the NYSE announced a moratorium on delisting
based on dual class capitalizations, and by 1988 more than 50 issuers were
in violation of the one-share, one-vote rule.' 43
In connection with its 1984 moratorium, the NYSE established a Sub-
committee on Shareholder Participation and Qualitative Listing Stan-
dards (the "Subcommittee") in order to re-evaluate the exchange's voting
policies. Believing that strict adherence to its one-share, one-vote policy
would cause the NYSE to lose listings to its competitor exchanges,'" the
Subcommittee explained that the NYSE was obliged to relax its rule be-
cause of competition from other exchanges and also in order to prevent a
"race to the bottom." Finally, in 1986, the NYSE officially modified its
"longstanding rule mandating a one-share, one-vote for all common
stocks listed on the NYSE. 1 45 Several factors influenced the NYSE to
reconsider the rule:
the growing competition for listings with the AMEX and NASD, the
desire of NYSE- listed companies to adopt disparate voting rights
plans as takeover defenses, the belief that corporate issues should
have flexibility in raising capital and adopting corporate structures,
and the belief that regulatory changes, such as improvements in cor-
porate disclosure, had made the shareholder protection provided by
the one-share, one-vote rule less important.146
The NYSE abandonment of its one-share, one-vote rule illustrates the
political organization of the exchanges and the limits of exchange regula-
tion.147 Competition among the exchanges was the primary cause leading
to revision of the rule. The NYSE folded after feeling pressured by listed
corporations to abandon its policy. Only if competing exchanges were
willing to adopt and enforce such a rule could the NYSE have upheld its
policy. During 1985 Congressional Hearings on one-share, one-vote, the
Exchange testified that "the national competitive environment may very
well preclude the Exchange from unilaterally retaining one share, one
vote. 1 48 Some also state that the NYSE's policy had endured primarily
for political reasons, and therefore the NYSE was easily susceptible to
outside pressures.' 49 Indeed, the NYSE's abandonment of the one-share,
one-vote rule has been used as a critique of exchange regulation, raising
questions about the exchanges' credibility in enforcing investor
143. See Nathaniel C. Nash, Big Board Defends Plan on 2 Classes of Shares, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 17, 1986, at D1; Voting Rights Standards; Disenfranchisement Rule, Exchange
Act Release No. 25,891, 53 Fed. Reg. 26,376, 26,379 (Jul 12, 1999) [hereinafter Disen-
franchisement Rule].
144. NYSE Subcommittee on Shareholder Participation and Qualitative Listing Stan-
dards, Initial Report-Dual Capitalization (Jan. 3, 1985).
145. Disenfranchisement Rule, supra note 143, at 26,376.
146. Id. at 26,377.
147. Pritchard, supra note 30, at 1001.
148. Self Regulatory Organizations, Proposed Rule Change by New York Stock Ex-
change, Inc. Relating to Amendments to the Exchange's Voting Rights Listing Standards
for Domestic Companies, Exchange Act Release No. 23,724, 51 Fed. Reg. 37,529, 37,530
(Oct. 17, 1986).




After attempts to persuade the exchanges to adopt a uniform voting
rights rule failed, in 1988 the SEC adopted its own rule to the Exchange
Act prohibiting listed companies from changing the voting rights of com-
mon stockholders. Recognizing that the abandonment of the NYSE rule
would have far reaching consequences, the SEC adopted Rule 19c-4 that
required the exchanges to bar the listing of a domestic corporation's se-
curities if that company acted disparately to reduce the per share voting
rights of existing stockholders. 15 The rule prohibited an issuer from issu-
ing securities, or taking other corporate action, which would either nul-
lify, restrict, or disparately reduce the per share voting rights of common
stockholders. 52 Nevertheless, disparate voting rights were permitted if
they served a bona fide business purpose. 53 The rule was intended to
achieve several contradictory goals: ensure management accountability;
limit hostile tender offer situations and adverse changes in corporate con-
trol; maintain the rights of public shareholders; limit competition among
SROs; and preserve the integrity of U.S. securities markets. 154
However, in 1990, in Business Roundtable v. SEC, 55 the D.C. Court of
Appeals abrogated Rule 19c-4 on the grounds that the rule directly con-
trolled the substantive allocation of powers among classes of shareholders
and therefore was in excess of the SEC's authority under section 19 of the
Exchange Act.156 In the court's view, the rule was not in furtherance of
any purpose of the Exchange Act, and could not be justified under the
proxy rules, the SEC's plenary power over exchanges, including its power
to approve or add to exchange rules, or its powers to facilitate the estab-
lishment of a national market system and designate securities qualified
for trading in such a system. This is because permitting the SEC to adopt
corporate governance standards through the back door by mandating uni-
form listing standards would disrupt state jurisdiction over corporate gov-
ernance and shareholder voting rights.' 57 Although an exchange could
adopt a voting rights listing standard, such a standard was not a rule
under the authority of the Exchange Act. This was not viewed as the
exercise of governmental power regulating an issuer.'
58
The Business Roundtable case did not put an end to the voting rights
rule story. After much negotiation with the SEC, the NYSE and Nasdaq
adopted a uniform rule that was essentially a modified version of former
SEC Rule 19c-4. The policy prohibited any restriction or disparate reduc-
150. Pritchard, supra note 30, at 1013-14.
151. Disenfranchisement Rule, supra note 143, at 26,383; SEC Approves New Voting
Rights Rule, Adopts Rule Streamlining SRO Regulation, 26 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
Dec. 23, 1994, at 1708 [hereinafter Streamlining SRO Regulation].
152. Disenfranchisement Rule, supra note 143, at 26,383.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 26,380.
155. 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
156. Id. at 407.
157. Id. at 412-13.
158. Id. at 414.
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tion in the voting rights of the common stock of public shareholders
through any corporate action. In view of changes in the marketplace, the
NYSE emphasized the "flexibility" of the new policy: "The Exchange's
interpretations under the Policy will be flexible, recognizing that both the
capital markets and the circumstances and needs of listed companies
change over time. '159 The rule was intended to eliminate a race to the
bottom in shareholder voting rights.' 60 It was the NYSE's stated aim to
permit those corporate actions previously permitted under Rule 19c-4.
As such, the policy does permit disparate voting rights and the listing of
non-voting common stock as long the stockholders are afforded certain
safeguards, which seek to align (as much as possible) the rights of non-
voting shareholders with voting shareholders.' 61 Minimum voting rights
are also required for preferred stockholders.
Several commentators have suggested that the primary motivator for
the NYSE's decision to maintain a voting rights rule was a "concern with
public opinion.' 162 However, the NYSE has emphatically stated that its
policy is based upon a desire to "encourage high standards of corporate
democracy."'1 63 It would appear that in the case of the voting rights rule,
as in the case of exchange rules concerning audit committees, the SEC
accomplished what the D.C. Circuit Court said it could not do-establish
a federal voting rights standard through the back door of exchange listing
standards. Yet, the legal basis for such initiatives is unclear and the tenu-
ous nature of the SEC's power in the corporate governance area weakens
the ability of exchanges to establish and enforce listing standards that
issuers find objectionable.
IV. THE CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE OF
LISTING STANDARDS
A. STOCK EXCHANGE DEMUTUALIZATION
When the Exchange Act was passed in 1934 and when it was amended
in 1975 to establish a framework for SEC regulation of exchanges, stock
exchanges all operated in the form of non-profit mutual or membership
organizations under state law. To the extent market power was not cur-
tailed by competition or regulation, mutual governance gave specialist or
159. NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 41, § 313.00 Voting Rights.
160. Streamlining SRO Regulation, supra note 151.
161. These safeguards ensure the following: (1) that the rights of non-voting common
shareholders are the same as those of voting common shareholders; (2) that non-voting
shareholders receive an annual report; and (3) receive all communications, including proxy
materials, received by voting shareholders. NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note
41, § 313.00(B)(1)-(3) Voting Rights (1999).
162. Seligman, supra note 24, at 698.
163. Id. at 699. The NYSE has cited the following and similar language from its Listed
Company Manual when denying listings: "Consistent with the Exchange's long-standing
commitment to encourage high standards of corporate democracy, every listed company is
expected to follow certain practices aimed at maintaining appropriate standards of corpo-
rate responsibility, integrity and accountability to shareholders." NYSE LISTED COMPANY
MANUAL, supra note 41, § 301.00 Introduction.
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market maker members of an exchange control of the price, quality, and
range of services produced by the exchange. Exchange profits were re-
turned to broker and dealer members in the form of lower access fees or
trading profits. Further, exchanges have long operated as self-regulatory
organizations ("SROs") with members contributing their time to govern-
ance and self-regulation to make exchanges more effective and more
profitable. Self-regulation gave exchanges more credibility as quasi-pub-
lic institutions and also protected their monopoly type powers.
Among these monopoly type powers was the trading of securities in
issuers that determined to list on the exchange. Although as far back as
the Multiple Trading Case in 1941,164 the SEC attempted to prevent ex-
changes from exercising a monopoly in the trading of an issuer's securi-
ties, the NYSE's off-board trading rule, Rules 390165 and Rule 500166
effectively prevented serious competition among exchanges in dually
listed stocks. The first significant attack on the monopolization of trading
in the stock of a listed issuer was Exchange Act Rule 19c-3, which permit-
ted exchange members to trade off-board as agent for customers, except
in agency crosses, and abolished off-board trading restrictions as to stocks
listed after April 26, 1979.167 In recent years, competition to exchange
trading monopolies has come from electronic communications networks
("ECNs") or alternative trading markets ("ATSs").
In addition to having to compete with new markets, the world's ex-
changes are demutualizing, and this is leading to new challenges. The
first exchange to demutualize was the Stockholm Stock Exchange in 1993,
followed by the Helsinki Stock Exchange in 1995, the Copenhagen Stock
Exchange in 1996, the Amsterdam Stock Exchange and the Borsa Ital-
iana in 1997, and the Australian Stock Exchange in 1998. By the end of
2000, many more exchanges will have joined this group, including the
Paris Bourse, the Toronto Stock Exchange, the London Stock Exchange,
and Nasdaq. 168 The NYSE had announced plans to demutualize in 1999,
but as yet has not taken steps to do so. 169 So far only the Stockholm and
Australian Stock Exchanges have gone public and listed on their own
164. 10 S.E.C. 270, 1941 WL 1566 (Oct. 4, 1941).
165. See Self-Regulatory Organizations, New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Order Ap-
proving Proposed Rule Change to Rescind Exchange rule 390, Exchange Act Release No.
42,758, 65 Fed. Reg. 30,175 (May 5, 2000).
166. This rule inhibits listed companies from delisting. It has recently been amended
but not repealed. Self-Regulatory Organizations, New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Order
Approving Proposed Rule Change and Amendment Nos. 1 and 2 Relating to Voluntary
Delistings by Listed Companies, Exchange Act Release No. 41,634, 64 Fed. Reg. 40,633
(July 27, 1999).
167. Off-Board Trading Restrictions, Exchange Act Release No. 16,888, 45 Fed. Reg.
41,125 (June 11, 1980); Off-Board Trading Restrictions, Exchange Act Release No. 16,889,
45 Fed. Reg. 41,156 (June 11, 1980).
168. See Exchange Demutualization Trend Sweeps World Markets, Int'l Sec. Outlook
(CCH), Oct. 18, 1999, at 4.
169. Stock Markets; NYSE, NASD Agree on Demutualization; Disagree on Self-Regula-




When the federal securities laws were passed, stock exchanges were
required to register with the SEC.171 The SEC thus obtained oversight
authority over stock exchanges, but the stock exchanges continued to
have rulemaking and regulatory authority with respect to their members,
their trading markets, and their listed companies. Although the efficacy
of self-regulation was called into question by stock market abuses re-
ported in the 1963 SEC Special Study,172 that study concluded that self-
regulation should be maintained and strengthened. 173 Nevertheless, in
1964 the SEC obtained greater direct authority over the continuous dis-
closures made by public companies. 174 Previously, the SEC was given
power to regulate financial disclosure by issuers making initial public of-
ferings, 175 but after 1964 the SEC also was given responsibility for regu-
lating annual and periodic reports.176
The 1975 Act further strengthened the SEC's oversight role over the
stock exchanges and NASD by, among other things, giving the SEC the
power to initiate and approve SRO rulemaking, 77 thus expanding the
SEC's role in SRO enforcement and discipline 178 by allowing the SEC to
play an active role in structuring the market. 179 For the first time, the
statute set forth requirements with respect to the composition of ex-
change and association boards of directors.' 80 The 1975 Act sought to
preserve and reinforce the concept of industry self-regulation with SEC
oversight. However, by directing the SEC to facilitate the creation of a
national market system, injecting competition as a statutory goal and giv-
ing the SEC greater authority over SRO rulemaking, disciplinary activi-
ties and other matters, the SEC became able to exert more leverage over
exchange self-regulation and corporate governance than in the past. In
addition to the imposition of audit committee and voting rights listing
standards described above, a good example of this leverage is the forced
reorganization of the NASD in 1996.181
170. See Gwen Robinson, ASX Shares Likely to Start Above A$3.50, FIN. TIMES., Oct.
14, 1998, at 18; Bengt Ryden, The Privatization of Stock Exchanges: The Case of Stock-
holm Stock Exchange, ISE REVIEW, July-Sept. 1997, at 1, 10-11 (1997).
171. Exchange Act, § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 78f.
172. See SEC, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKET, H.R. Doc. No. 88-
95, pt. 4, at 201-12 (1963).
173. Id. pt. 5, at 502.
174. See Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565 (1964).
175. See Securities Act of 1933, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1999).
176. See Exchange Act, §§ 12(g), 14(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(g), 78n(a).
177. See Exchange Act, § 19(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (1994).
178. Id., §§ 19(c), (d), (g).
179. See id., § 11A.
180. See id., §§ 6(a)(3), 15A (b)(4).
181. The NASD was completely reorganized in the aftermath of a Department of Jus-
tice and SEC investigation into anti-competitive practices by OTC market makers. See In
the Matter of National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., Report Pursuant to Section
21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Regarding the NASD and the Nasdaq Mar-
ket, Exchange Act Release No. 37,542, 62 S.E.C. 1385 (Aug. 8, 1996). The SEC criticized
the NASD for its regulatory deficiencies in failing to uncover these practices or discipline
its members, and found that the NASD was unduly influenced by Nasdaq market making
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The 1996 NASD reorganization resulted in the creation of a parent
holding company and two operating subsidiaries-Nasdaq and NASD
Regulation, Inc. ("NASDR"). All three boards are constituency boards
that are required to have a majority of non-industry members. 182 NASD
governance is again in a state of flux because of a restructuring that will
result in the sale of 78% of Nasdaq to issuers and NASD members and
will lead to the registration of Nasdaq as a stock exchange with the
SEC.183
Among the purposes of the demutualization of Nasdaq are to permit
the NASD to focus more intently on its original mission: of being a mem-
bership-focused organization; to streamline corporate governance; and to
create a financially stronger Nasdaq better able to address competitive
challenges and invest in new technology. 18 4 The Nasdaq board will be
restructured prior to its registration as an exchange. Currently, all 10
members of the Nasdaq board sit on the NASD board. It is contemplated
that the Nasdaq board will be increased by four members who will not
serve on the NASD board, two of whom will be industry members and
two of whom will be non-industry members. 185
One of the more contentious questions under discussion concerning ex-
change demutualization is the future of self-regulation. There are several
issues that have been raised. First, some have argued that there would be
conflicts of interests between shareholders and members in a demutual-
ized exchange environment that would diminish the ability of exchanges
to engage in effective self-regulation. A potentially more serious conflict
is the regulation of an ATS market by the NYSE or NASD. Second, se-
curities firms are concerned about the costs of multiple SROs, especially
if several ATSs become exchanges and begin to engage in self-regulation.
Therefore, some industry members are arguing in favor of a single SRO
firms with respect to rulemaking, the disciplinary process and the admission of new mem-
bers. In a settlement of these matters, the NASD agreed, among other things, to achieve
greater diversity of representation on its board and its policy making committees, to pro-
vide for the autonomy and independence of its staff with respect to disciplinary and regula-
tory matters, to create an enhanced audit trail, and to improve its surveillance and
examination of order handling and the reliability of trade reporting. See id. at 1386-87.
182. See By-Laws of the NASD, art. VII, § 4(a), Nasdaq By-Laws, art. IV, § 4.1,
NASDR By-Laws, art. IV, §§ 4.2, 4.3, NASD GUIDE (CCH), 1315, 1503, 1703-3.
183. See Nasdaq, Fact Sheet on the Proposed NASD Restructuring, available at http://
www.nasdaqnews.com/news/pr2000/fact3l3.html. On April 14, 2000, the membership of
the NASD voted overwhelmingly to turn Nasdaq into a for-profit company and alter its
ownership structure. See Nasdaq Firms Solidly Favor Sale of Market, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15,
2000, at C3. This transformation will be accomplished in two stages. In the first stage, up to
49% of Nasdaq's common stock was offered in a private placement to NASD members,
Nasdaq issuers, institutional investors, and strategic partners. After a further sale of Nas-
daq stock in a second phase, either by way of a public offering or private placement, the
NASD will own only a minority stake of approximately 22% of Nasdaq. See Terzah Ewing,
NASD Members Vote to Sell Nasdaq, Paving the Way for Private Ownership, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 17, 2000, at C21; see also NASD, Press Release, NASD Restructuring Wins in Land-
slide Vote of the Members, at http://www.nasdaqnews.com/news/pr2000/nesection00_091.
htm.




for exchanges and member firms.186
Exchanges engage in self-regulation in four areas: listed company gov-
ernance and disclosure; surveillance and discipline of their markets and
specialists, floor brokers and market makers; member firm financial and
operational compliance; and fair and equitable treatment of customers.
Of particular relevance to the future of listing standards is what conflicts
will be encountered if and when Nasdaq or the NYSE become public
companies.
In that situation, it would seem anomalous for them to negotiate listing
agreements with themselves and then supervise continuing compliance
with such agreements. For this reason, when the Stockholm and Austra-
lian Stock Exchanges went public, government regulators were assigned
the task of overseeing exchange disclosure to shareholders. 187 On the
other hand, the NYSE and Nasdaq will continue to have a motivation to
market their exchanges as lists of quality issuers. Further, once ex-
changes demutualize, they can become embroiled in takeover battles.1 88
It is precisely in such situations that corporate governance listing stan-
dards come into play. If a demutualized exchange becomes a target in a
hostile takeover would it be able to enforce listing standards that prevent
the erection of defenses to such an unwelcome bid? As Dean Joel Selig-
man has observed with regard to the effect of competition on the willing-
ness of exchanges to enforce rigorous listing standards:
Given the determined efforts of the New York Stock Exchange in
the 1963-1975 period to retain fixed commission rates and to oppose
rescission of Exchange rules that limit competition in the trading of
securities listed on the Exchange, as well as its recent championing of
disparate common stock voting rights, there seems no plausible basis
for assuming that the Exchange would be more prepared to enforce
disclosure rules opposed by listed corporations than it had been
before 1934. However enlightened the intentions of the Exchange's
leadership, retention of its membership (or listings) inevitably will
require it to reflect members' and listed firms' economic interests.1 89
Even without regard to demutualization, because of the legal limbo
into which exchange listing requirements were thrust by the Business
Roundtable case, it has been suggested that stock exchange corporate
186. Securities Indus. Assoc., Reinventing Self Regulation, at http://www.sia.com/
demutualization/index.html; Securities Indus. Assoc., Recommendations Regarding Self-
Regulatory Structure, at http://www.sia.com/demutualization/html/recommendationsre
garding__self.html; Securities Indus. Assoc., Reinventing Self-Regulation: White Paper for
the Securities Industry Association's Ad Hoc Committee on Regulating Implications of
Demutualization), Jan. 5, 2000, at http://www.sia.com/legal-regulatory/pdf/selfreg.pdf .
187. See Roberta S. Karmel, Stock Exchange Demutualization in Sweden and Australia,
N.Y. L.J., Aug. 19, 1999, at 3. In the United States, however, the SEC already has this
authority.
188. James R. Hagerty, Swedish Bid for Bourse Clouds Deal-London-Frankfurt Tie is
Further Complicated by Unexpected Offer, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2000, at A13; Erik
Portanger, Exchange in London Now in Play-Swedish Concern OM Launches Hostile Bid
Valued at $1.19 Billion, WALL ST. J., Aug. 30, 2000, at A18.
189. Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 46, vol. I, 222.
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governance standards be dismantled.1 90 On the other hand, at least one
commentator has argued that the benefits of increased capital mobility
would be better realized through regulatory decentralization than greater
centralization. Under a decentralized model, exchanges should be the
primary writers and enforcers of rules relating to disclosure by listed com-
panies, standards of conduct for member broker-dealers and for market
structure. 191 Whether this model would work for demutualized ex-
changes is a good question. By what authority could a for-profit public
company regulate other companies?
B. THE NEW SOCIAL PROTESTERS
1. The Political Protesters
At times of social protest against business, corporate governance be-
comes a political issue. The corporate governance debates of the late
1970s were an aftermath of the anti-government, anti-business ferment of
the Nixon years. The post-Watergate period at the SEC gave rise to the
sensitive payments program and Hearings on Corporate Governance.
The SEC threatened to adopt sweeping new disclosure regulations de-
signed to compel corporate boards to select independent directors and
otherwise rein in corporate managers.
Although the SEC then backed off from some of its more controversial
proposals, and corporate governance reform was not an SEC priority dur-
ing the Reagan and Bush administrations, institutional investors began to
make their views felt with regard to corporate governance issues. Be-
cause of the SEC's questionable authority in this area, pressure to reform
corporate governance generally was exerted through changes in the proxy
rules, Internal Revenue Service regulation of executive compensation, 192
changes in SEC disclosure rules, and changes in stock exchange listing
requirements.
Harbingers of a new anti-business activism may be spotted now. An
international movement protesting globalization has emerged to question
multinational corporate activity and the operations of the World Bank
and similar international organizations. 193 This backlash against global-
ization does not have a coherent program and is comprised of disparate
anti-capitalist radical groups that have a common loathing of the estab-
lished economic order.1 94 Some groups emphasize labor issues, others
environmental issues, and others focus on human rights and the allevia-
tion of poverty.195
190. Michael, supra note 3, at 1461.
191. See Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453 (1997);
Pritchard, supra note 30; Romano, supra note 93, at 2399.
192. 26 U.S.C. § 162m (1999).
193. See Roger Cohen, Growing Up and Getting Practical Since Seattle, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 24, 2000, at 1.




The street protesters at the World Trade Organization, International
Monetary Fund, and World Bank conferences have counterparts among
legal academic scholars. A comprehensive proposal to reform the SEC's
proxy disclosure rules with regard to labor, environmental, and other so-
cial and political goals appeared in a recent issue of the Harvard Law
Review. 196 Other scholars have written about other aspects of this incho-
ate movement against international business. 197 According to Professor
Cynthia Williams, while the SEC was probably correct that broader social
disclosure was not material to investors based on the typical 1970s inves-
tor, today there is reason to believe a substantial and growing subset of
investors consider social disclosure material. Today, both the economic
investor as well as the social investor could benefit from increased social
disclosure by public companies. "[T]he trend is toward greater investor
interest in social investing. And because people in the social investor sec-
tor of the market are using socially significant information to make in-
vestment decisions, that information is clearly material to them,
irrespective of its economic implications. 1 98 Nevertheless, "social inves-
tors withdrawing their capital from certain companies will not raise those
companies' cost of capital, and thus will have little short-term financial
impact on the companies."' 99 While pressure on stock exchanges to re-
form their listing standards has not occurred, if the SEC is pressured to
react to these new protesters, the SEC could turn to the exchanges, as it
did with audit committee reform, and request changes in listing stan-
dards. When it is recognized that some of the biggest and loudest institu-
tional investors are government pension funds, this type of political
reaction to serious corporate criticism is not as far fetched as it might
seem.
Further, big corporations have been persuaded to adopt voluntary
codes of conduct embodying some of the objectives of today's activists.
The business world has recently established the new Global Sullivan Prin-
ciples-global core labor standards modeled after those made for South
Africa during the 1970s. Similar environmental standards have been pro-
posed by the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies
("CERES") called the "Valdez Principles" and some corporations have
adopted these standards aimed at preserving the environment. In 1995,
President Clinton established his own set of voluntary ethical standards
for multinationals known as the "Model Business Principles," which en-
courage businesses to adopt voluntary codes of corporate conduct.200
196. Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate So-
cial Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197 (1999).
197. Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: For Whom are Corporate Manag-
ers Trustees, Revisited, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1021 (1996); Maria O'Brien Hylton, "Socially
Responsible" Investing: Doing Good Versus Doing Well in an Inefficient Market, 42 AM. U.
L. REV. 1 (1992).
198. Williams, supra note 196, at 1288-89.
199. Id. at 1294.
200. For a discussion of the effect of globalization of labor markets, see Henry H.
Drummonds, Transnational Small and Emerging Business in a World of Nikes and
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The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
("OECD") is pushing for the adoption of international corporate govern-
ance guidelines. As more corporations become transnational, they may
adopt some of the European social welfare philosophies. In Germany,
for example, corporations are required by law to operate the company for
the common good.201 In the United States, union and government em-
ployee pension funds that are large institutional investors tend to be par-
ticularly interested in social responsibility and corporate governance
issues. 202
It is likely that the SEC would channel pressures for corporate reform
into shareholder proposals under the proxy rules, rather than trying to
mandate new corporate governance structures. This benign solution
might not satisfy the activists, however. Further, changing academic
scholarship about the theory of the firm could have an impact upon the
SEC and stock exchanges.
2. New Theories of the Firm
The contractarian model theory of the firm, deriving from law and eco-
nomics scholarship, has been a dominant model in recent years.203 Many
traditional scholars continue to reject this model204 and some scholars
have been fashioning new theories, perhaps best described as a stake-
holder model.20 5
Under contractarian principles, a view of stock exchange listing re-
quirements as matters of private contract law between an exchange and
Microsofts, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 249. For a discussion of environmental issues,
see Elizabeth G. Gross & Andrew E. Skroback, Environmental Activism and the Ethical
Investor, 22 J. CORP. L. 465, pt. D (1997). For a discussion of human rights issues, see John
Christopher Anderson, Respecting Human Rights: Multinational Corporations Strike Out,
2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 463, 482-83 (2000).
201. Symposium, Corporate Social Responsibility: Paradigm or Paradox, 84 CORNELL L.
REV. 1282, 1291 (1998).
202. See Joseph Evan Calio & Rafael Xavier Zahralddin, The Securities and Exchange
Commission's 1992 Proxy Amendments: Questions of Accountability, 14 PACE L. REV. 459,
471-77 (1994); Patrick J. Ryan, Rule 14a-8, Institutional Shareholder Proposals, and Corpo-
rate Democracy, 23 GA. L. REV. 97, 148-49 (1988) (describing increased activity by institu-
tional investors through the use of Rule 14a-8 proposals); Barnaby J. Feder, Talking
Business: Companies Face the Social Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1998, at D2 (interview
with Timothy Smith, executive director of Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility).
203. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW (1991); Lucian Arye Bebchuck, Federalism and the Corporation: The
Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435 (1992);
Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520 (1990); Henry
N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-
Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1999).
204. MELVIN EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALY-
sis 111-27 (1976); Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric
of Contract Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403 (1985).
205. William Bratton, The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives
From History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1989); John C. Coffee, Jr., Unstable Coalitions: Cor-
porate Governance as a Multi-Player Game, 78 GEo. L.J. 1495 (1990); Lawrence Mitchell,
A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70
TEXAS L. REV. 579 (1992).
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an issuer makes sense. Under traditional theories, the SEC's approach to
social protest as limited to its statutory mandate of investor and share-
holder protection fits comfortably. Further, a view of stock exchange list-
ing standards as investor protection devices under the umbrella of the
Exchange Act is not a stretch. But how will stock exchange listing stan-
dards fit into a stakeholder model of the firm? Under this model, share-
holders are not the only corporate constituencies. Labor, customers, and
communities also matter.
Another new theory of the firm undermining the traditional share-
holder primacy model is the team production model.206 Under this the-
ory directors act as mediators to determine how profits should be
allocated between shareholders and other stakeholders. Under this
model, director independence is very important and therefore corporate
governance listing standards encouraging director independence are criti-
cal. Listing standards encouraging good corporate citizenship or social
responsibility could also be important because the political nature of the
corporation is recognized by this theory.20 7
Does this mean an exchange could establish as a listing standard that
only corporations adhering to CERES' Valdez principles can list? In the
current political climate such a scenario seems unlikely, but times change.
If Professor Williams is correct in her assertions, then a blue chip com-
pany could become one that is environmentally sensitive, as well as one
with a large market capitalization. Such an emphasis on qualitative,
rather than quantitative, listing standards would bring the NYSE full cir-
cle back to its original 1869 concerns about a listed company's general
reputation in the business community.
V. CONCLUSION
The use of listing standards by exchanges to achieve a competitive edge
has produced varying results over time. From 1869 until the mid 1980s
the NYSE tried to differentiate itself from the AMEX and Nasdaq by
having higher listing standards and advertising a blue chip issuer list. Un-
til the mid 1960s the AMEX attracted listings by having virtually no list-
ing standards. In the 1980s the AMEX led the race to undermine the
voting rights of shareholders in order to list Wang and other issuers. In
order to achieve its goal of a blue chip exemption for its listed companies
Nasdaq maintained and improved its listing standards during this same
period. Yet, all of the exchanges petitioned the SEC for relaxed listing
standards for foreign issuers because they saw strict corporate govern-
ance standards for foreign companies as a barrier to obtaining listings.
When the federal securities laws were passed in the early 1930s federal
law supplanted many exchange listing standards, but the limits of SEC
authority over corporate governance standards was demonstrated in the
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one-share, one-vote controversy. However, in the case of audit commit-
tees, the SEC was able to pressure the exchanges to enhance corporate
governance listing standards.
In a future marketplace of demutualized for-profit exchanges it is diffi-
cult to predict whether listing standards will be used as a differentiating
marketing device for selling higher quality trading products, or whether
listing standards will be abandoned in a competitive race to list issuers. It
is likely that the ability of exchanges to adhere to and enforce listing stan-
dards that become unpopular with listed companies will be more difficult
for exchanges that are themselves listed companies. Whether the SEC
would be able to compel exchanges to maintain and improve such listing
standards is entirely a matter of politics. Very little tinkering with section
19(c) of the Exchange Act would be required for Congress to overturn
the result of the Business Roundtable case. Also, the case could be distin-
guished or overruled in subsequent cases.
Other private section solutions are also possible. The securities indus-
try has employed self-regulation in a wide variety of ways to avoid direct
government regulation. It can be anticipated that even if stock exchanges
become unable to effectively raise and police the corporate governance
standards of their listed companies, some self-regulatory solutions to re-
sulting problems will be proposed as preferable to direct SEC regulation
of corporate governance.
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